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We explore the effects of domestic environmental standards when a domestic firm and 
a foreign rival compete in the domestic market. We focus on a situation where the 
introduction of environmental standards forces the foreign product out of the domestic 
market because it does not meet the standards. Such prohibitive standards may 
induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good through R&D or 
licensing obtained from the domestic firm. However, this does not guarantee that the 
product, which now complies with the environmental standards, will improve the 
environment. In the case of licensing, governments may intervene to shift the rent 
from the domestic firm. In certain circumstances, the shifted rent could exceed the 
amount paid by the foreign firm for licensing. 
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Concern for environmental destruction has been growing in the world. To protect en-
vironment, various environmental policies are adopted all over the world. However,
attitudes towards environmental destruction are diﬀerent across countries. Thus, some
countries adopt more stringent policies than others. Examples include environmental
standards. For instance, exhaust emission and fuel consumption regulations are more
stringent in developed countries than in developing countries and hence automobiles in
developed countries are environmentally more friendly.
It is often observed that governments prohibit ﬁrms from selling those products that
do not meet certain environmental standards. Such stringent standards (i.e., prohibitive
standards) may work as trade barriers and protect domestic producers. For example,
the United States banned imports of yellowﬁnt u n aa n dt h e i rr e l a t e dp r o c e s s e dp r o d u c t s
from Mexico based on the Marine Mammal Protection Act.1 The EU prohibited the use
of chrysotile asbestos products and banned their imports from Canada in 1998.2 In 2002,
China introduced the China Compulsory Certiﬁcation, under which foreign ﬁrms cannot
export to China without implementing certain standards including environmental ones.
When domestic standards are prohibitive for foreign ﬁrms, however, they may have an
incentive to circumvent them. For example, foreign producers may develop new products
which meet the domestic standards. It is also widely observed that foreign ﬁrms obtain
licenses to produce environmentally friendly products or key intermediate inputs to clear
standards from their domestic rivals.3
The purpose of this paper is to explore the eﬀects of environmental standards in
the framework of international oligopoly. We ask whether prohibitive standards actually
protect environment and whether prohibitive standards actually beneﬁt domestic ﬁrms.
In particular, we analyze a situation under which prohibitive standards lead foreign ﬁrms
1The United States also restricted imports of shrimp and shrimp products from India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines under Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 of 1989.
2Moreover, in the EU, electronic and electrical equipment that does not comply with the RoHS
(Restriction of Hazardous Substances) directive restricting the use of six hazardous materials in the
manufacture cannot be imported. The EU also introduced a regulation called Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in 2006 to protect human health and environment.
Supply of chemical substances to the EU which have not been pre-registered or registered is illegal.
3For example, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC) and PSA Peugeot Citroën have announced
that MMC will provide PSA an MMC-made electric vehicle for Europe. The vehicle will be sold under
Peugeot brand, in parallel to Mitsubishi’s own vehicle. Nissan Motor Co. is developing lithium-ion
batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles. They are planning to provide it to other auto makers.
2to engage in R&D or get licenses from domestic rivals to produce goods that meet the
standards. In this situation, we compare with and without standards from the viewpoint
of environmental quality and domestic proﬁts. We also compare between R&D and
licensing. Furthermore, the presence of R&D and licensing leads to strategic interactions
between domestic and foreign ﬁrms and generates rent. We speciﬁcally examine the
opportunities of rent-shifting across countries in the presence of R&D and licensing.
To this end, we build a simple model in which a domestic ﬁr ma n daf o r e i g nr i v a l
produce slightly diﬀerentiated products and compete in the domestic market. Both do-
mestic and foreign products generate negative externalities during either production or
consumption. However, the foreign product damages environment more than the domes-
tic product. For example, foreign cars (say, gasoline cars) emit more carbon dioxide than
domestic cars (say, hybrid cars). The domestic government introduces a standard which
the domestic product satisﬁes but the foreign product does not. To serve the domestic
market, therefore, the foreign ﬁrm has to produce a product meeting the domestic stan-
dard through either R&D or licensing. In this circumstance, we obtain counter-intuitive
results that prohibitive standards may deteriorate environment and/or hurt the domestic
ﬁrm. Although the foreign ﬁrm may be led to produce an environmentally friendly good,
prohibitive standards do not guarantee an improvement in environment.
In our model, the domestic ﬁrm strategically licenses their technologies or supplies
a key intermediate input to the foreign rival when the foreign ﬁrm is willing to engage
in R&D to produce a good meeting the standard. That is, the domestic ﬁrm intends to
deter the foreign ﬁrm from engaging in R&D. Such a strategy mitigates the loss of the
domestic ﬁrm caused by the reentry of the foreign ﬁrm to the domestic market. When
the domestic ﬁrm sets the license fee or the input price, it tries to extract rent from
the foreign ﬁrm as much as possible. However, the foreign government may intervene
to manipulate rent-shifting through taxes and subsidies.4 We point out that the foreign
government can shift the rent from the domestic ﬁrm to the foreign government either
directly or indirectly. Interestingly, the shifted rent could exceed the payment from the
foreign ﬁrm to the domestic ﬁrm. Moreover, the presence of rent-shifting could make the
license fee negative.
There exist many studies that investigate environmental policies in the presence of
4We examine simple intervention through taxes and subsidies. For strategic environmental policy,
see Barret (1994), Kennedy (1994), Conrad (1996,2001), Ulph (1996), Tanguay (2001), and Kiyono and
Ishikawa (2004), among others.
3international trade.5 However, relatively little attention has been paid to environmental
standards in open economies.6 In an international duopoly model, Fischer and Serra
(2000) consider optimal minimum standards and examine whether they are protectionist.
Haupt (2000) examines the relationship between environmental product standards and
environmental R&D in a monopolistically competitive sector in a two-country model.
On the basis of a model with environmentally diﬀerentiated products and heterogeneous
consumers, Toshimitsu (2008) shows that a strict emission standard on an imported
product may or may not increase social surplus. Ishikawa and Okubo (2009) also show
that stringent environmental standards may actually worsen environment. However, they
focus on ﬁrm relocation caused by product standards in the framework of new economic
geography.
Although strategic use of licensing has been studied in the literature of industrial
organization, those studies basically deal with a closed economy.7 Thus, one cannot con-
sider rent-shifting across countries. Only few studies analyze strategic use of licensing
or input supply in the open economy framework. Chen et al. (2004) show that under
international duopoly, trade liberalization leads to strategic outsourcing to the rival ﬁrm,
which has a collusive eﬀect. Horiuchi and Ishikawa (2009) explore the strategic relation-
ship between tariﬀs and North—South technology transfer in an oligopoly model when
technology is embodied in a key component that only North ﬁrms can produce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present an interna-
tional Cournot duopoly model with negative externalities. We consider a situation under
which consumption generates emissions that deteriorate environment.8 Then we examine
emission standards in section 3. Speciﬁcally, we consider the foreign production of the
domestic good through either R&D or licensing. In section 4, we explore the rent-shifting
by the foreign government in the presence of R&D and licensing. Section 5 concludes.
5See Rauscher (2005) for the literature survey.
6We deal with only compulsory standards in our analysis. Eco-laballing scheme is voluntary standards
i nt h es e n s et h a tp r o d u c t sc a nb es o l di nt h em a r k e teven if they do not meet certain standards. For
the analysis of eco-labelling scheme under international oligopoly, see Abe et al. (2001) and Tian (2003),
among others.
7In the industrial organization literature, licensing is strategically used to (partially) deter entry. See
Gallini (1984) and Yi (1999), for example.
8Regarding the case of production externalities, see section 5.
42B a s e M o d e l
We consider two goods X and Y , which are imperfect substitutes. Good X is produced
by a foreign ﬁrm (ﬁrm f), that exports the good to the domestic country. In the domestic
country, a domestic ﬁrm (ﬁrm d) produces good Y .T h e t w o ﬁrms engage in Cournot
competition in the domestic market. We assume that emissions are generated through
consumption of the products. By an appropriate choice of units, one unit of consumption
of good X generates one unit of emissions and that of good Y results in 0 <k<1 units
of emissions. The emissions cause negative externalities.
Demands are characterized by a representative consumer that consumes goods X
and Y as well as a numéraire good. The numéraire good is competitively produced and
freely traded between countries, and generates no externalities. We assume the following
utility function:
U = αxf + βyd −
(xf)2 +( yd)2
2
− φxfyd + m − V,
where x, y and m are, respectively, the consumption of goods X and Y and the numéraire
good, V (> 0) is externalities, α and β are parameters, and 0 < φ < 1 is a parameter
indicating the degree of substitutability between goods X and Y . Following Fischer and
Serra (2000) and Lai (2004), we assume that the representative consumer ignores the
negative externalities when making the consumption decisions.9
Then the inverse demands for the imperfectly substitutable goods X and Y are,
respectively, given by
px = α − xf − φyd, (1a)
py = β − yd − φxf, (1b)
where px and py are the consumer prices of goods X and Y . Consumer surplus (CS) is
given by
CS = αxf + βyd −
(xf)2 +( yd)2
2




The proﬁts of ﬁrms f and d can be written respectively as
πf =( px − cf
x)xf,
πd =( py − cd
y)yd,
9There is another modelling in which consumers care about environmental damage when making the
consumption decisions. For example, in Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002), consumers diﬀer
in their willingness-to-pay for goods due to diﬀerent environmental awareness.
5where c
j
i (i = x,y;j = f,d) is the constant marginal cost (MC) of ﬁrm j to produce good
i. Then the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for proﬁt maximization are:
dπf
dxf = −xf + px − cf
x =0 ,
dπd
dyd = −yd + py − cd
y =0 .





4 − φ2 ,yd
0 =
2B − φA
4 − φ2 ,
where A ≡ α−c
f
x and B ≡ β−cd




y), becomes smaller, A (B) becomes larger. We call A (B)t h ee ﬀective market size
for good X (Y ). We assume that both ﬁrms serve the domestic markets in equilibrium,
that is,
2B − φA>0,2A − φB>0. (2)








Thus, the following lemma is immediate:
Lemma 1 The proﬁts increase if and only if the output rises.
3E ﬀects of Standards
In this section, we consider the eﬀects of emission standards. The domestic government
introduces an emission standard, λ, which sets a maximum amount of emissions per unit
of product consumption. If a product does not satisfy the standard, its sale is prohibited
in the domestic country. In our analysis, we speciﬁc a l l yc o n s i d e ra ne m i s s i o ns t a n d a r d
which good X does not satisfy but good Y does (i.e., k ≤ λ < 1). Thus, in the presence
of such a standard, ﬁrm f has to give up exporting to the domestic country.10
3.1 Monopoly
The standard leads ﬁrm d to be a monopolist in the market. In the equilibrium denoted









10In this section, since only good Y is produced and consumed, subscript y is suppressed.







therefore, the standard beneﬁts the domestic ﬁrm and reduces emissions. The change in
CS is
∆CSM ≡ CSM − CS0 =
¡
8A +4 Bφ − 6Aφ2 + Bφ3¢
(Bφ − 2A)
8(φ +2 )
2 (φ − 2)
2 < 0.
Since 2A − φB>0, CS falls. Thus, the welfare eﬀect is generally ambiguous.
3.2 R&D
In the presence of emission standards, ﬁrm f cannot serve the domestic market. Hence
ﬁrm f may try to produce good Y to serve the domestic market. In the rest of the
section, we examine such a situation. We speciﬁcally consider two possibilities. In the
ﬁrst case, ﬁrm f incurs ﬁxed costs (FCs) of R&D, F, to develop good Y by itself. In the
second, ﬁrm d licenses ﬁrm f a technology to produce good Y .F i r md may provide ﬁrm
f with a key intermediate input such as a hybrid engine to produce good Y instead of a
technology to produce the key input.
As long as ﬁrm f can make a positive proﬁt from R&D, it has an incentive to invest
in R&D. With R&D investment, both ﬁrms f and d supply good Y to the domestic
market. Since there is only good Y in the market, the inverse demand is:
p = β − (yf + yd),
where yf is the output of ﬁrm f. The proﬁts of ﬁrms f and d are:
πf =( p − cf)yf − F,
πd =( p − cd)yd,
where ci (i = f,d) is the constant MC of ﬁrm i to produce good Y .I n t h e R & D
















We compare the R&D equilibrium with the initial laissez-faire equilibrium. We ﬁrst





0, ﬁrm f has no incentive to produce good X even without standards.










3Aφ − 2B − Bφ2 + δ(4 − φ2)
3(4 − φ2)
.
Thus, the R&D under the standard beneﬁts ﬁrm d i fa n do n l yi fΩ ≡ 3Aφ−2B −Bφ2 +
δ(4 − φ2) > 0. This condition is likely to be satisﬁed when A is large relative to B,a n d
δ and φ are large. A relatively large A implies relatively large demand for good X,a n d
hence the prohibitive standard causes a relatively large demand shift to good Y .Al a r g e
δ implies that ﬁrm d is much more eﬃcient in production of good Y than ﬁrm f.T h u s ,
the entry of ﬁrm f into the good-Y market does not decrease the output of ﬁrm d much.
Al a r g eφ implies that goods X and Y are close substitutes. Thus, the entry of ﬁrm f
into the good-Y market caused by the elimination of good X does not aﬀect the output
of ﬁrm d much.
The change in CS is given by


















28B2 − 36A2 − 18ABφ3 +2 7 A2φ2 − 5B2φ2 +4 B2φ4
+δ (φ − 2)
2 (φ +2 )
2 (δ − 4B)
!
18(φ +2 )
2 (φ − 2)
2 .
In general, the sign of ∆CSR is ambiguous. ∆CSR > 0 is likely to hold when when A is
small relative to B.W i t h∆CSR > 0,an e g a t i v ee ﬀect due to the decrease in variety is
dominated by a positive eﬀect due to the increase in good Y .









4 − φ2 + k
2B − φA
4 − φ2 ).
If k is suﬃciently small, then ∆eR < 0, that is, the emission standard decreases the total
emissions. However, if k is close to 1, the total emissions may increase. Evaluating ∆eR






4 − φ2 +
2B − φA
4 − φ2 )
=
B − 3A +2 Bφ − δ(φ +2 )
3(φ +2 )
.
From the continuity argument, the total emissions increase if Ψ ≡ B − 3A +2 Bφ −
δ(φ +2 )> 0 and k is suﬃciently close to 1. This condition is likely to be satisﬁed when
8A is small relative to B, δ is small and φ is large. A prohibitive standard eliminates
the consumption of good X, but increases that of good Y through the foreign R&D.
Although the emission per unit of consumption of good Y is lower than that of good X,
this could be dominated by the increase in the total consumption of good Y and hence
the total emissions could rise. A small A,as m a l lδ and a large φ tend to increase the
output of good Y relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium when a prohibitive standard
induces ﬁrm f to enter the good Y -market.
Again, the welfare eﬀect is generally ambiguous. If A = B and δ =0 , for example,
then ∆yR < 0, ∆CSR < 0 and ∆eR < 0 holds, that is, the proﬁts of ﬁrm d and
CS decrease but the environmental damage is mitigated. Thus, if the mitigation of
environmental damage is large (small), domestic welfare could improve (deteriorate).
The above analysis establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that an emission standard leads ﬁrm f to incur ﬁxed R&D costs
to develop good Y . By comparing this R&D equilibrium with the equilibrium without
the standard, there exists a range of parameterization under which the total emissions
increase. Firm d gains from the standard if and only if Ω > 0.D o m e s t i cw e l f a r em a yo r
may not improve.
3.3 Licensing
We now examine ﬁrm d’s technology licensing to ﬁrm f and compare this licensing
equilibrium with the R&D equilibrium. We assume that before ﬁrm f decides whether
or not to engage in R&D, ﬁrm d decides whether or not to oﬀer a take-it-or-leave-it
licensing oﬀer to ﬁrm f.12 When ﬁrm f will not develop good Y , ﬁrm d has no incentive
for licensing. This is because ﬁrm d can enjoy the monopoly situation without licensing.
Therefore, we consider the case where in the absence of licensing, ﬁrm f is willing to
develop good Y through R&D, which harms ﬁrm d. In this situation, ﬁrm d has an
incentive to grant ﬁrm f permission to use its technology to produce good Y in return
for license fees, because licensing generates revenue for ﬁrm d and mitigates its loss.
Thus, ﬁrm d designs a licensing contract so that ﬁrm f is willing to accept it. It should
be noted that ﬁrm d cannot extract all the rent from ﬁrm f by license fees because of
ﬁrm f’s outside option, i.e., R&D.
12The qualitative nature of our results would remain unchanged even if licensing fees are determined
by bargaining between the two ﬁrms.
9In the presence of licensing, proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are given by
πf =( p − cf)yf − (R + ryf)=( p − cf − r)yf − R
πd =( p − cd)yd +( R + ryf),
w h e r ew ec o n s i d e rt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ and hence R and r are, respectively, a ﬁx e df e ea n da
per-unit royalty.13 For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrm f’s MC under licensing and that
under R&D are the same. We can regard (cf + r) as the eﬀective MC of ﬁrm f.










R is ﬁrm f’s proﬁts with R&D. In the equilibrium, ﬁrm f is indiﬀerent between
R&D and licensing. The appendix proves the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Firm d sets r = r(≡ (B − 2δ − 3
q
(B−2δ
3 )2 − FÁ2) and R =0 .
This lemma implies that even if two-part tariﬀsa r ea v a i l a b l e ,ﬁrm d charges only








B + δ + r
3
.
Comparing with the R&D case, the proﬁts of ﬁrm d are larger, because licensing generates
a license fee and makes ﬁrm f less competitive due to the higher eﬀective MC. CS and
the total emissions are smaller, because the total consumption of good Y is smaller. The
diﬀerence in the total emissions is given by




Thus, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Licensing increases the proﬁts of ﬁrm d relative to R&D. CS and the
total emissions under licensing are less than those under R&D.
13In the case where ﬁrm d supplies a key input to ﬁrm f instead of licensing, the constant MC to
produce the input is normalized to be zero and R =0 .
14This result depends on the assumption that ﬁrms f and d produces a homogenous good. If the good
ﬁrm f produces under prohibitive standards is diﬀerentiated from good Y ,t h e nR>0 could arise.
104 Rent-shifting in the Presence of R&D and Licensing
In the presence of licensing, ﬁrm d sets license fees to extract rent from ﬁrm f as much
as possible. However, the foreign government can shift the rent back from ﬁrm d.I nt h i s
section, we explore the rent-shifting through simple taxes and subsidies adopted by the
foreign government. We consider three measures to shift the rent. One is direct measures
and the other two are indirect ones.
First, we consider direct measures when ﬁrm d supplies a key intermediate input to
ﬁrm f. Suppose that the foreign government imposes a tariﬀ on the input. This usually
causes tariﬀ shifting. That is, the tariﬀ increases the input price which ﬁrm f faces. In
our model, however, ﬁrm d cannot directly shift the tariﬀ to ﬁrm f, because the tariﬀ
shifting leads ﬁrm f to engage in R&D. In fact, the foreign government could generate
more than full rent-shifting through tariﬀs, that is, the shifted rent could exceed the
payment from the foreign ﬁrm to the domestic ﬁrm.15
Suppose that the foreign government imposes a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, t,o nt h ei m p o r to ft h e
key input. Even if a tariﬀ is imposed, ﬁrm d cannot raise the price beyond r.W h e nt = r,
therefore, the payment by ﬁrm f are fully shifted from ﬁrm d to the foreign government.
However, it should be noted that the proﬁts of ﬁrm d are still larger under licensing than
under R&D even with t = r, because ﬁrm f’s eﬀective MC under licensing, cf + r,i s
higher than that under R&D, cf. This implies that the foreign government can increase
the tariﬀ rate beyond r without aﬀecting the price. We should mention that in this case,
at a r i ﬀ does not aﬀect the output of each ﬁrm and hence the total emissions.







L; s.t. πf ≥ π
f
R.









R is the proﬁts of ﬁrm d with R&D. In the equilibrium, πd
Lt = πd
R holds, that is,
ﬁrm d is indiﬀerent between R&D and licensing.
Next we investigate indirect measures to shift the rent. Firm d can charge license fees,
because ﬁrm f’s proﬁts become larger under licensing without any fees than under R&D.
That is, the licensing results in room for arbitrage for ﬁrm d. The foreign government
15The domestic government can shift some rent back to the domestic country by imposing a tariﬀ on
good Y .
11can indirectly shift the rent by reducing the room. Suppose that a production tax is
collected from ﬁrm f under only licensing.16 If a production tax, τ, is introduced before
ﬁrm d makes a licensing oﬀer, we have r + τ = r. T h i si sb e c a u s eﬁrm f will engage
in R&D if the eﬀective MC (which equals cf + r + τ) exceeds cf + r.B yi n c r e a s i n gτ,
therefore, the license fee, r, falls. That is, a production tax reduces room for arbitrage.
In particular, by setting τ = r, ﬁrm f gets the license without any payment to ﬁrm d.
A si nt h ec a s eo ft a r i ﬀs on a key input, the foreign government can raise the tax rate
further, because ﬁrm f’s eﬀective MC (which equals cf + r i nt h ec a s eo fp r o d u c t i o n
taxes) is higher under licensing than under R&D. Therefore, we have r<0 with τ > r
in the equilibrium. In this case, the total emissions remain constant, because both ﬁrm
f’s eﬀective MC, cf + r + τ = cf + r,a n dﬁrm d’s MC are constant.









By aﬀecting the constraint, production taxes make indirect rent-shifting possible. The







The foreign government can also indirectly shift the rent from ﬁrm d through a
lump-sum R&D subsidy, S,t oﬁrm f, which is committed before ﬁrm d moves. We ﬁrst
consider a case in which y
f




R)2 −F<0 hold and hence ﬁrm f does not
engage in R&D. In this case, by setting the subsidy S ≥− π
f
R, the foreign government can
induce R&D. Since ﬁrm d prefers licensing to R&D, however, ﬁrm d oﬀers a licensing
contract whenever the subsidy leads ﬁrm f to engage in R&D. This implies that the
foreign government does not pay the subsidy in equilibrium. Even if ﬁrm f engages in
R&D without the subsidy, the foreign government could use R&D subsidies as a device




πd; s.t. πf ≥ π
f
R + S.
Thus, the license fees become lower as the subsidy rises. To maximize the shifted rent,
the foreign government sets S = F so that πd
Ls = πd
R holds. With S = F, ﬁrm f obtains
the license without any payment. Moreover, with S = F, the total emissions are the
same with those under R&D.
Thus, we obtain:
16It is assumed that no production tax is imposed when ﬁrm f engages in R&D.
12Proposition 3 The foreign government can shift the rent associated with licensing from
ﬁrm d to the foreign country directly by levying a tariﬀ on the key intermediate input
and indirectly by imposing a production tax on ﬁrm f under licensing or by committing
itself to an R&D subsidy. The shifted rent could exceed the payment by ﬁrm f with the
tariﬀ on the key input. The license fees could be negative with the production tax on ﬁrm
f. The rent-shifting does not aﬀect CS and the total emissions.
In the licensing equilibrium where the foreign government completely shifts the rent
from ﬁrm d, the proﬁts of ﬁrms f and d are the same with those in the R&D equilibrium.
CS and the total emissions are less under R&D, because the rent-shifting does not aﬀect
the total consumption and emissions. Thus, domestic welfare is higher in the licensing
equilibrium with complete rent-shifting than in the R&D equilibrium if and only if the
mitigation of environmental damage dominates the reduction of CS.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using an international duopoly model, we have analyzed the eﬀects of environmental
standards in the presence of consumption externalities. We have focused on a plausible
situation under which both domestic and foreign products generate emissions during
consumption, but the foreign product results in more damage to environment than the
domestic product and an emission standard drives the foreign product out of the domestic
market.
Such prohibitive standards may induce the foreign ﬁrm to produce a good meeting
the standard through R&D or licensing, but do not guarantee an improvement in environ-
ment. This is because the eﬀect of an increase in the consumption of the environmentally
friendly good dominates the eﬀect of the elimination of the environmentally unfriendly
good. By comparing between R&D and licensing, the environmental damage is less un-
der licensing, because the eﬀective MC of the foreign ﬁrm is higher under licensing than
under R&D and hence the consumption is smaller under licensing. Moreover, prohibitive
standards may not beneﬁt the domestic ﬁrm when the foreign ﬁrm starts serving the
domestic market with R&D or licensing.
We have also pointed out possible strategic interactions between the domestic ﬁrm
and the foreign government as well as between the domestic and foreign ﬁrms in the
presence of R&D and licensing. The foreign government can shift rent from the domestic
ﬁrm by levying a tariﬀ on a key intermediate input, by imposing a production tax on the
13foreign ﬁrm under licensing, or by committing itself to R&D subsidies. In particular, the
shifted rent could exceed the payment by the foreign ﬁrm with the tariﬀ and the license
fees could be negative with the production tax on the foreign ﬁrm. The presence of an
outside option (i.e. R&D) plays a crucial role to derive the results.
The ﬁnal three remarks are in order. First, we have not fully explored the welfare
eﬀects. This is because to examine domestic welfare in details, we need to specify the
damage function, V . The welfare analysis depends on the speciﬁcation of the damage
function. In particular, when only good Y is produced, the environmental damage is
mitigated if and only if CS falls. Thus, the welfare eﬀects are in general ambiguous.
If the environment is evaluated highly enough, then domestic welfare could improve
whenever the total emissions fall.
Second, the analysis can directly be applied to the case with production externalities.
However, the GATT/WTO usually regards trade restrictions based on processes and
production methods as illegal. For example, the GATT judged that the US ban on
imports of yellowﬁn tuna and their related processed products from Mexico was against
the GATT agreement. Thus, even if foreign production generates negative externalities,
the domestic government may not be allowed to ban the imports of foreign goods.
Last, the analysis of R&D and licensing is valid even if standards are not prohibitive.
For example, suppose that the domestic country introduces an eco-labelling scheme under
which a label can be aﬃxed only on the domestic product. Although the foreign product
can still be sold in the domestic market, the sales may decrease. If the decrease is large
enough, then the foreign ﬁrm may have an incentive to produce a product on which the
label can be put.
In this paper, we have focused on a plausible situation in which a domestic prohibitive
standard induces the foreign ﬁrm to produce the domestic product meeting the standard
through R&D or licensing. However, one can think of many other situations. The
analyses under these situations are left for future research.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Given r, the equilibrium outputs are
yf =
B − 2(δ + r)
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+ F,
which takes the maximum value at r =( B +4 δ)/2 ≡ r∗.I fﬁrm d sets r = r∗, then the
output of ﬁrm f becomes zero. Thus, the maximum royalty ﬁrm d can charge, r,s a t i s ﬁes
(
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